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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
MARRIAGE WITHIN THE STATUTORY PROHIBITED PERIOD
AFTER DIVORCE
The problem of the legal consequences of subsequent marriage
by parties to a divorce action within the restricted period after the
granting of an interlocutory or absolute decree of divorce is one
that often confronts the practicing attorney. The laws of various
states relating to such prohibition can be classified into two general
groups: those that postpone the dissolution for a period of time after
an interlocutory degree1 and those that make it a penal offense to
marry after the granting of an absolute degree.2 Not only the period
of time that such restriction continues3 but which of the parties is
affected materially differs from state to state.4 This diversity of
statutory enactments among the states is possible because a state is
fully sovereign in its control of marriage and divorce; the federal
government has no supervisory power over it.-
To ascertain the policy of a state the nature and objective of its
statutes must be examined. A particular statute relating to the status
of marriage is valid in the state of its enactment, and may or may
not be given extra-territorial effect. Generally, however, a marriage
contracted validly in one state will be so recognized in another, even
though it would have been invalid had it been consummated in the
other state. There is a decided conflict of authority regarding which
law governs the capacity to marry.6 Under one interpretation, such
capacity depends on the law of the state where the marriage is
celebrated - the lex loci celebrationis - and not on domicile ;' while
under the other personal capacity is governed by the law of the state
of domicile.8
1 For a complete enumeration of these states see 35 Am. Jur., Marriage 56-83,
and the annotations in 32 A.L.R. 1088.
2 Ibid.
3 This time varies from 6 months to life; however, one year is the most common
period of restriction after divorce.
4 In some states only the guilty party to the divorce action is prohibited from
remarrying; in others, both parties are restricted from marrying for a certain
period. The apparent purpose of such limitation is to discourage the breaking
up of an existing family to enable one of the parties to marry a third person.
It may be questioned, however, whether the provision actually accomplishes
the desired result, or whether it may result in adultery between the divorcee
and the third person during the prohibited period. This clandestine relationship
between the ex-spouse and the third party, which its certainly incompatible with
the idea of matrimony, may lead to their not being married at the end of the
prohibitory period. The end result would be break-up of the original family,
adultery of the divorcee, and the frustration of the potential new family.
SHaddock.v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1905).
0 35 Am. Jur., Marriage 56-83.
7 Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35, 44 Am. Rep. 81 (1882).
6 Greehow v. James, 80 Va. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 603 (1885).
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POSTPONEMENT OR PENALTY
In determining whether a state statute can be evaded by merely
crossing the boundary to another state, the provisions of such statute
must be examined to ascertain whether it makes a remarriage within
the prohibited time merely subject to a criminal penalty, or whether
it postpones the dissolution of the matrimonial knot for a prescribed
period. Generally, if the statute postpones the dissolution of the marital
relation, both parties are bound by a decree in the sense that a
marriage by either of them in another state within the prohibited
period will not be recognized.9 In Heflinger v. Heflinger,0 Charles
Heflinger was granted a divorce from his wife, Verna, by a decree
of the circuit court of Norfolk, Virginia. The statutes of Virginia
provided that no marriage could be validly consumated within six
months after the granting of the interlocutory decree. Charles, within
the six-month period, went to Baltimore, Maryland, with Clelia, a
resident of Virginia, and was married there. After the marriage
ceremony the parties returned to Virginia and shortly thereafter Clelia
filed a bill for annulment on the sole ground that the marriage was
void under the laws of Virginia. The court granted the annulment,
even though Clelia knew of the prohibitory period, stating:""
"If the effect of the provision of the statute or the decree of
divorce is to postpone the dissolution of the former marriage
until the lapse of the prescribed period, it is clear that a re-
marriage within that period will not be recognized or given
effect in the state where the decree was granted, or, for that
matter, in any other state, since, ex hypothesi, one of the
parties at the time of the remarriage had not the status of an
unmarried person."
The court further held that this provision relating to postponing the
dissolution of the marital tie was within the protection of the full
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 2 Contrasted to
those states where an interlocutory degree is entered and the divorce
postponed for a period of time are others where an absolute divorce 3
is entered but a penalty is provided if remarriage takes place within
a certain time after the decree. In Hoagland v. Hoagland,14 an action
to determine the validity of a remarriage which 'occurred within the
penalty period in another state and the parties then returned to the
state of their domicile, the court stated: "a state will not refuse to
9 Anno. 32 A.L.R. 1088.
10 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316 (1923).
"1 Ibid, at page 321.
12 U. S: Const., Art. 4, Sec. 1. The same result was reached in Atkeson v.
Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, et al, 90 Okla. 154, 216 Pac. 467(1923).
23 Anno. 32 A.L.R. 1116.
1427 Wyo. 178, 193 Pac. 843 (1920).
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recognize the validity of a marriage of a divorced person solemnized
in another state for the purpose of evading its laws, where the statute
merely forbids such marriage within a prescribed time, under penalty."
VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE WERE CELEBRATED
The consensus of authority is if the divorce of another state is
effectual to finally dissolve the matrimonial relationship and if the
remarriage is not contrary to the policy and laws of the state in which
it is celebrated, such remarriage will be upheld in the latter state,
notwithstanding that one or both of the parties were under a re-
striction of another state at the time of its celebration. 15 In Powel v.
Powell,16 one of the parties had procured a divorce in Indiana. The
Indiana statutes provided that where a resident of the state goes,
with the intent of evading the effect of the statute relative to immediate
remarriage, to another state and marries immediately, such marriage
shall be null and void. A marriage was celebrated in Illinois, but the
parties did not return to Indiana. The Illinois court held that, since
the marriage was consummated in Illinois, the laws of Illinois and
not Indiana must govern the marriageable status of the parties. The
effect of this decision is important, especially since the Indiana statute
provided for an interlocutory decree. The same question of state
comity was presented in Frame v. Thormann.'7 There the court upheld
the validity of a remarriage in Wisconsin although one of the parties
had previously been divorced in Louisiana for adultery, and the statutes
of Louisiana prohibited remarriage of the guilty party if a divorce
were granted on that ground. The court stated:"'
"The statutes of another state, prohibiting a person who has
been divorced for adultery from remarrying, have no extra-
territorial force, and cannot prevent him from lawfully re-
marrying in this state."
The court did not distinguish between a decree that postpones the
divorce and one that provides for a penalty after a divorce, although
clearly the second type was involved in this case. There is, however,
no indication that the decision would have been different had an
interlocutory degree been involved. The court further pointed out
that the decision turned upon considerations of comity and did not
involve the full faith and credit clause of the United State Con-
stitution.'9
15 Fordham v. Marrero, 273 Fed. 61 (1921); Powell v. Powell, 207 Ii. App. 292
(1917), affirmed in 282 Ill. 357, 118 N.E. 786 (1918); Van Storch v. Griffin,
71 Pa. 240 (1872) ; Frame v. Thorman, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N.W. 39 (1899).
16 Ibid.
7 Supra, note 15.
IS Ibid, at page 672.
29 Ibid, at page 669.
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UNIFORM MARRIAGE EVASION AcT
To clarify the problem of whether one state should recognize the
prohibitions after divorce imposed by another state, the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act20 was proposed. Up to the present time only
five states - Illinois (1915),21 Louisiana (1914),' Massachusetts
(1914), 23 Vermont (1912),2- and Wisconsin (1915)2 5 - have adopted
the act. The act provides:
Sec. 1. If any person residing and intending to continue to
reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from
contracting marriage under the laws of this state shall
go into another state or country and there contract a
marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of
this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all
purposes in this state with the same effect as though
such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this
state.
Sec. 2. No marriage shall be contracted in this state by a party
residing and intending to continue to reside in another
state or jurisdiction, if such marriage would be void
if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction and
every marriage celebrated in this state in violation of
this provision shall be null and void.
Sec. 3. Before issuing a license to marry to a person who
resides and intends to continue to reside in another
state the officer having authority to issue the license
shall satisfy himself by requiring affidavits or other-
wise that such person is not prohibited from inter-
marrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he
or she resides.
Sec. 4. Any official issuing a license with knowledge that the
parties are thus prohibited from intermarrying and
any person authorized to celebrate marriage who shall
knowingly celebrate such a marriage shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by..."
The act has not proven effective, as evidenced by the fact that it
was withdrawn from the active list of Uniform Acts recommended
for adoption by the states in August, 1943.-7
209 Uniform Laws Annoted, Miscellaneous Acts 479.
21 Smith-Hurd Ill. St., (Ef. 1915) c. 89, para. 19-24.
22Darts Gen. St. (Ef. 1914) para. 2186-2189.
23 Gen. Laws, Ter. Ed., c. 207 (Ef. 1914) para. 10-13, 50.24Pub. Laws, (Ef. 1912) para. 3006, 3067, 4087.
25 Wis. Stat. sec. 245.04, see infra, note 29.26Wisconsin has not adopted sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
- See supra, note 20, cumulative annual pocket part, at page 105.
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THE WISCONSIN PROBLEM
In Wisconsin, the statutes relating to divorced persons and their
ability to remarry within a prescribed period are Sections 245.0328 and
245.04.29
Generally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a marriage
within one year after the interlocutory decree of divorce is void
ab initio if such remarriage is celebrated within the state"0 or if con-
summated outside of the state with the parties returning to Wisconsin.3 1
There is a conflict of interpretation, however, when the parties leave
the state with intent to establish domicile elsewhere and remarry
within the year following the Wisconsin decree.3 2
In Lanhan v. Lanham, 3 the leading case on this subject, the plain-
tiff on and prior to the 15th day of September, 1905, was a resident
of Wisconsin and was the wife of one J. R. Sherman. On the day
she obtained a divorce from Sherman in order to marry James W.
Lanham, a resident of Wisconsin and a man eighty-four years of age.
For the purpose of avoiding the one-year restriction, they went to
Michigan, were married, and immediately returned to Wisconsin,
where they lived until J. W. Lanham's death, two years later. The
court held the Michigan marriage void, stating :34
"To say that the legislature intended such a law to apply only
while the parties are within the boundaries of the state, and
that it contemplated that by crossing the state line its citizens
could successfully nullify its terms, is to make the act essentially
useless and impotent and ascribe practical imbecility to the law
making power. A construction which produces such an effect
should not be given it unless the terms of the act make it
necessary. The prohibitory terms are broad and sweeping. They
declare not only that it shall be unlawful for divorced persons
to marry again within the year, but that any such marriage
shall be null and void. There is no limitation as to the place
of the pretended marriage in express terms, nor is language
2sWis. Stats. 245.03: "(1) No marriage shall be contracted while either of
the parties has a husband or wife living * * *.
"(2) It shall not be lawful for any person, who is a party to an action for
divorce from the bonds of matrimony, in any court in this state, to marry again
until one year after judgment of divorce is granted, and the marriage of any
such person solemnized before 'the expiration of one year from the date of
the granting of judgment of divorce shall be null and void."29 Section 245.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes is identical with Secs. 1 and 2 of
the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act quoted in the body of this comment.
30 Dallmann v. Dallman, 159 Wis. 480. 149 N.W. 137 (1915).
31Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908).
32 Hall v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 313
(1917); Owen v. Owen, 178 Wis. 609, 190 N.W. 364 (1922).
'3 See m.pra, note 31. See also Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 171 N.W. 685
1920), where the court held that a marriage not completely severed by the insult
of divorce was completely void; that leaving the state to avoid statutory require-
ments and then to return would not inject life into a marriage void at its in-
ception.
3 See supra, note 31, at page 367.
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used from which such a limitation can naturally be implied.
It seems unquestionably intended to control the conduct of the
residents of the state whether they be within or outside of
its boundaries."
In Rogers v. Hollister,35 Martha Rogers provided in her will that
"if Fred Rogers is my husband at my decease * * * I give all my per-
sonal property"'36 to him. The parties were divorced and during the
one-year period subsequent to the interlocutory degree Martha died.
The court held that Fred Rogers was not her husband during the
one-year period immediately following the entry of the interlocutory
decree. This decision that the parties are not husband and wife during
the interlocutory period deprives a conclusion that a subsequent mar-
riage by one of the parties during the prohibited period is void of
any support other than the statute expressly declaring it void. In
other words, no support is found from those statutory provisions 3T
declaring invalid bigamous marriage.
In Dallman v. Dallman3 both the divorce and subsequent re-
marriage within the year took place in Wisconsin. There the plaintiff
brought an action for annulment of his marriage to the defendant.
The court granted annulment and stated.3 9
"* * * when a party to an action in which the interlocutory
judgment of divorce was entered, * * * married again before
entry of the final judgment, such marriage was unlawful and
might be annulled."
In Jensen v. Jensen4 the seriousness of violating the one-year
restriction was presented. The action involved the custody of a child.
The appellant remarried in the state of Michigan three months after
her divorce in Wisconsin from the appellee and returned immediately
after such marriage to Wisconsin. The court held, after recognizing
that the -marriage was a direct violation of the law, that the -offense
was "not serious enough to warrant the appellant being deprived of
the custody of the child.
The question of comity between the states in recognizing divorce
statutes and subsequent remarriages within the prohibitory period pre-
sents a conflict of authority on the subject in Wisconsin. This con-
flict is illustrated by two Wisconsin cases, Hall v. Industrial Commis-
Sion of Wisconsin4' and Owen v. Owen.42 The Owen case was ap-
35 Rogers v. Hollister, 156 Wis. 517, 146 N. W. 489 (1914).
36 Ibid., at page 518.
37 Wis. Stats. 351.02.
38 See supra, note 30.
39 See supra, note 30, at page 487.
40 168 Wis. 502, 170 N.W. 735 (1919).
41 See supra, note 32.
42 See supra, note 32.
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proved by Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald43 and is the law in Wisconsin today.
All three cases were decided after the enactment of the Uniform Mar-
riage Evasion Act,"4 and involve statutes of Illinois and Wisconsin,
two of the five states which have adopted such act. In the Hall case
the laws of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana were involved. In the
Owen case the laws of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois were in-
volved. An Illinois divorce was involved in both cases prior to re-
marriage. In the Hall case the parties went to Indiana from Illinois
and were married within the restricted period of the Illinois statute.
In the Owen case, the parties went to Michigan from Illinois and
were married within the year provided by the Illinois statute. Both
the Indiana and Michigan marriages were questioned in Wisconsin.
In the Hall case the remarriage was questioned in a defense to the
widow's claim for workmen's compensation, while in the Owen case
the remarriage came into question because the husband filed a bill
for annulment. The decision of the Hall case declared the Indiana
marriage void; in the Owen case the Michigan marriage was held
valid. The validity of the Michigan marriage was upheld in the Owen
case because the court declared the Illinois statute was penal in
nature and, therefore, had no extra-territorial force. However, the
very same statute was involved in the Hall case.
In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald,45 the statutes of Wisconsin, Illinois,
and Indiana were involved. After an Illinois divorce, the parties went
to Indiana, were married within the restricted period, and then came
to Wisconsin. The court upheld the decision of the Owen case, not-
withstanding Sec. 245.04 Wisconsin Statutes."6 The court stated 4
"A marriage between persons domiciled in Wisconsin, contracted
in Indiana, is valid although one of the parties to it had been
divorced by a decree of the Illinois courts, and a statute of that
state in effect at the time made marriages contracted within
one year of divorce invalid, and the marriage in question was
entered into within less than one year after the divorce, as
the Illinois statute had no extra-territorial force."
The effect of the Wisconsin statute on one who remarries within
the year after the interlocutory decree but who celebrates such marriage
in another state and intends to establish domicile in that state was
partially answered by the decision of Elies v. Elies. s There, Ruth
Elies was granted a divorce from Arthur Elies and within the year
43210 Wis. 543, 246 N. W. 680 (1933).
-4 See supra, note 20.
4 See supra, note 43.
46 See supra, note 29.
47 See supra, note 43, at page 546.
48239 Wis. 60, 300 N.W. 493 (1941) ; see also Kilmer v. Kilmer, 23 N.W. (2d)
510, Wis. (1946).
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married one Harris in Iowa after the parties had become residents of
Iowa. The marriage was consummated after advice of counsel in Iowa
that the Wisconsin decree postponing the divorce for one year had
no extra-territorial effect. The action was brought to partially vacate
the judgment of divorce granting custody of a child to Ruth. The
court refused to modify the judgment and in effect sustained the
appellee's contention that the Wisconsin interlocutory decree of divorce
will not be changed in any respect when one of the parties remarries
within the prohibitory period but does so in another state with intent
to remain in that state. This decision was supported by the following
language of the court :49
"The fact that the divorced mother remarried in Iowa within
one year from the entry of the judgment of divorce in Wisconsin
would not support an inference that she was unfit to have the
custody of her child, where the marriage in Iowa within the
year was entered into only after the contracting parties had
become bona fide residents of Iowa, expecting to remain such
residents indefinitely, and after advice of counsel that such
marriage would be valid, and where another marriage cere-
mony was performed after a year from the entry of the judg-
ment of divorce."
As hereinbefore stated, a remarriage within the year after the
granting of a divorce, where such remarriage and divorce are cele-
brated in Wisconsin or where the remarriage takes place in another
state and the parties return to Wisconsin, is void by Section 245.04,
Wisconsin Statutes;m however, by Section 245.35, Wisconsin Stat-
utes,5 " such remarriage may flower into legality after the termination
of the one-year period if one of the parties entered into it in good
faith and in full belief that the other could celebrate a legal ceremony.2
49 Ibid., at pages 66, 70.
50 See supra, note 29.
51 Wis. Stats. 245.35. "If a person during the lifetime of a husband or wife with
whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract
* * * , and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife,
and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one of the parties
in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, or
that the former marriage had been annulled, or dissolved by a divorce, or
without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after the impediment
to their marriage has been removed by the death or divorce of the other party
to such former marriage, if they continue to live together as husband and wife
in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married
from and after the removal of such impediment and the issue of such subse-
quent marriage shall be considered as the legitimate issue of both parents."
52 28 Marq. Law Review 50 (1944) and cases there cited.
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CONCLUSION
Under the statutes of Wisconsin, a remarriage within one year
after the interlocutory decree is declared null and void. A remarriage
in Wisconsin within that period can be annulled, as can a remarriage
out of the state where the parties return to Wisconsin during the
one-year period and it can be annulled at any time, even after the
termination of the year, if a second marriage ceremony is not per-
formed. A marriage, however, which is celebrated in another state
with intent to remain in the latter state is valid for all intents and
purposes, and the Wisconsin decree of divorce will not be set aside
or modified because of such violation, although the parties are not
completely divorced by the interlocutory decree in Wisconsin. The
prohibitory statute does not purport to invalidate such marriages,
covering only those where the parties intend to remain Wisconsi
residents. It has been observed that invalidity of such subsequent
marriages can rest alone upon the prohibitory statute. Query as to
the power of a state by statute to invalidate the subsequent marriages
of those no longer resident in the state.
Because of the conflict of authority53 on this subject, a uniform
marriage and divorce act would be desirable, but it seems practically
unattainable because of the wide difference of opinion in the various
states on the subjects of marriage and divorce.5 4 Possibly a federal
enactment on marriage and divorce would solve the problem, assum-
ing constitutional barriers could be somehow surmounted.
NORRIS NORDAHL
53 15 Marq.'Law Review 37, at page 41 (1930).
54 8 Wis. Law Review 27 (1932).
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